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ABSTRACT
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A COMPARISON 
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The public sector in Turkey which was founded in the early 1930’s for the 
production of basic consumer goods has been accused of being a drain on public 
resources and of accounting for the bulk of the public deficits since the early 
1980’s. This thesis investigates if the effect of efficiency on the distribution of 
bank credit is different for public and private firms. Firm level efficiencies are 
estimated from production function and these estimated efficiencies are used to 
estimate the capital structure equation. The results show that the efficiency of a 
firm affects its access to bank credit negatively for public sector and positively for 
private sector.
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ÖZET
MÜLKİYET, VERİMLİLİK VE BORÇLAR:
TÜRKİYE’DEKİ KAMU VE ÖZEL FİRMALARIN KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI
B. Nilgün Erkaya
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, iktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Y. Doç. Dr. İzak Atiyas 
47 Sayfa 
Ağustos, 1997
Türkiye’de ana tüketici mallarını üretmek için 30’lu yıllar başında kurulan 
kamu sektörü 80’li yıllar başından beridir kamu kaynaklarını kullanmak ve kamu 
borçlarının sorumlusu olarak görülmektedir. Bu yüksek lisans tezi, verimliliğin 
banka kredilerinin dağılımı konusunda kamu ve özel sektörlerde farklılık gösterip 
göstermediğini incelemektedir. Firmalara özel verimlilikler, üretim 
fonksiyonlarından tahmin edilip sermaye yapısı eşitliğini tahmin etmek için 
kullanılmıştır. Sonuçlara göre, kamu firmalarında verimlilik banka kredilerine 
erişimi ters orantılı bir şekilde etkilerken, özel firmalarda doğru orantılı bir şekilde 
etkilemektedir.
ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Türkiye, Banka Kredisi, Kamu Teşebbüsler,
Verimlilik, Sermaye Yapısı
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l.INTRODUCTION
In the early 1930’s, the public enterprise sector in Turkey was founded for 
the aim of producing basic consumer goods. This sector emphasized the 
production of intermediate goods starting from the early 1960’s. It has a large 
share in gross capital formation and it has a remarkable impact on aggregate 
production, employment, and savings. When we consider various forms of 
government participations, it is true to conclude that more than half of the Turkish 
economy is owned or controlled by the government. But, since the early 1980’s, 
the public enterprises have been accused of being a drain on public resources, and 
accounting for the bulk of the public deficits in Turkey.
The relatively poor performance of the public enterprises has been noticed 
in both developing and developed countries, and has led most countries to 
privatize their enterprises. The privatization of public enterprises has encouraged 
the researchers to compare the performance of public and private enterprises on 
the basis of efficiency.
On the other hand, the liberalization of the financial markets in Turkey has 
increased firms’ access to bank credits. Firms are less financially constrained now. 
There is also evidence that financial resources are allocated more efficiently than 
before; more specifically, it is found that the correlation between debt and 
efficiency has become positive after the liberalization took place (Atiyas and 
Yiilek, 1997).
My aim in this thesis is to compare the allocation of bank credit among 
public and private firms in Turkey. More specifically, I would like to compare the 
role of firm-level efficiency in the distribution of credit, controlling other possible 
determinants of debt. The idea is that while efficiency is expected to have a 
positive effect on firm-level debt among private firms, this may not be the case 
among public firms due to the soft budget constraint. Firm level data are used 
from the annual manufacturing surveys carried out by the State Institute of
Statistics over the period 1985-1993. Firm specific efficiencies are estimated from 
production functions. The estimates of the efficiencies are then used to estimate 
capital structure equation for both public and private firms.
I ’he results show that the efficiency of a firm affects its access to bank 
credit negatively for public sector and positively for private sector. This is an 
evidence for the difference of public and private firms in their access to bank 
credit.
The thesis is organized as follows: The next section reviews the public 
enterprises. The data and the econometric method used to estimate firm level 
efficiency indices are discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 examines estimations of 
capital structure equation with different regression models and explains the 
estimation results. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis.
2.THE SETTING
Starting from mid 1930’s, the state assumed the role of the entrepreneurial 
class and created public enterprises in a broad range of manufacturing activities*. 
Even after the emergence of the private sector in the late 1940’s, the state still was 
an agent of industrialization. Electoral politics has supplemented the inertial 
momentum of public sector expansion^. Even during the 1950’s, when the 
Demokrat Party pledged itself into privatization, the politicians could not even 
slow the rate of creation of the SOlZs. In the 1960’s, the military deepened the 
public enterprise sector in industry to prepare Turkey for entry into the European 
Common Market (EC), while the politicians of the Adalet Party continued the 
practices of their Demokrat forerunners. The 1970’s witnessed electorally driven 
SOE expansion coupled with heavy external borrowing that produced the debt 
crisis of 1978-1979. This crisis was fueled by the need to finance growing deficits 
of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
As Turkey entered 1980’s, it had some 32 large holding companies, 
designated as commercial state economic enterprises (SEEs), and another 10 
conglomerates, known as public economic institutions, that were and are official 
monopolies or provide basic services to the Turkish people. Altogether these 
holding companies and institutions owned 105 companies and another 40 
subsidiaries. In 1985, the industrial SEEs accounted for 45% of the production of 
the top 500 firms, 27% of total industrial value-added, and 45% of total industrial 
investment. Table 1 gives sectoral product shares of SOE undertakings:
' See Zaim and Tajkin, 1997. 
 ^ SeeWaterbury, 1993.
TABLE 1. The share o f Turkish SOEs in sectoral production , 1986
Sector SOE shares %
Minerals 90
Textiles 57
Food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco 15
Forest products 14
Paper 56
Petroleum, chemicals, rubber, plastic 68 
Cement 21
Basic metals 49
Mineral products 15
Automotive industry 10
Electricity 91
The SOE sector of Turkey has grown to some extent by the acquisition of 
failing private sector enterprises, or what are called ‘sick’ industries in India. On 
the other hand, state planners and politicians in Turkey have the common interest 
of expansion of the SOE sector. The state bankers also share this interest. 
Specialized lending, especially in the industrial sector, has led over time to the 
conversion of private debt to public equity.
International donor and commercial creditors for years helped finance SOE 
expansion in Turkey. After all, the SOE sector constituted a large market the 
borrowings of which were almost invariably guaranteed by the state treasury. In 
addition, the SOEs had been obliged to take on unneeded employment and 
electorally driven wage increases during a period of rapidly rising costs of 
imported energy. As a result of these, the 1980 stabilization and adjustment 
program which was market oriented and which had the aim of liberalizing the 
economy, was not successful in decreasing the reliance of the public enterprises on
 ^ Source; Turkish Republic, Yüksek Denetleme Kurulu (1987), 150.
the government budget. Hence, SOEs still have a remarkable impact on aggregate 
production, employment, and savings. The Turkish state maintains a significant if 
not dominant position in the following list of activities through its SOEs:
power generation 
railroads
port administration 
highways
urban transportation 
telephone and telegraph 
radio and television 
media and book 
publishing 
construction 
agricultural extension 
irrigation perimeters
textiles
iron and steel
aluminum, copper
petrochemicals
fertilizers
petroleum products 
machine tools 
heavy engineering 
consumer durables 
consumer nondurables 
food and beverages 
electronics 
cars, trucks, buses, 
tractors
banking and insurance 
agricultural credit 
industrial credit 
small business credit 
crop purchasing 
retail and wholesale trade 
foreign trade 
railroad rolling stock 
mining (iron, copper, 
coal, etc.) 
defense industries 
airlines, shipping 
hotels
There is no major sector except agricultural production that state has left to 
private enterprise, and in several sectors the SOEs enjoy a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic position. Table 2 shows share of SOEs in the production of a certain 
number of sectors:
TABLE 2. SOE shares in production in Turkey^, mid-1980's (%)
Sector SOE Share in Production, Mid-1980’s (%)
Mining
Coal 100
Crude petroleum 49
Basic metals
Iron and steel 69
Copper 100
Manufacturing
Sugar 73
I'obacco 100
Petrochemicals 100
Textiles 17
Paper 66
Chemical fertilizers 24
Source: Yüksek Denetleme Kurulu (1988), 24-25.
Expenditures on SOEs in Turkey are much higher than those in 
industrialized countries' .^ The largest items in the expenditures of the 
industrialized nations are in the area of social services (health, education, and 
social security), although for some, such as the United States, defense claims a big 
piece of outlays. Outlays on public enterprise as a proportion of GDP are relatively 
low, ranging in 1982 between 6% and 11% for a select group including Sweden, 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. But in Turkey, these 
generalizations do not hold. The ratio of SOE expenditures to GDP is 28% percent 
in the same years. The level of income does not predict the public sector size. But, 
what we can conclude is that public enterprise occupies a major place in the 
overall government expenditures.
The SOEs have been a drain on public resources, rather than generating 
surpluses, and they account for the bulk of public deficits in developing countries. 
The overall deficits of public enterprise sectors are a particularly large component 
of government deficit in the lesser developed countries (LDCs). For industrial 
countries overall SOE deficits averaged 2.1% of GDP over the period 1974-1977, 
while for developing countries the average was 4.6 %. This value for Turkey was 
6.1% meaning that Turkey has run much larger deficits than the average for all 
developing nations. The SOEs constitute a net drain on the treasury and a major 
contributor to the economic crisis at the end of 1970’s. Table 3 shows this 
situation:
See Waferbury, 1993.
TABLE 3. Consolidated budget o f Turkey, 1973-89^ (TL billions, current)
Year Budget deficit 
( A )
Financial 
requirements o f  
SOEs 
( B )
Budget 
transfers to 
SOEs 
( C )
Public sector 
borrowing 
requirement 
( A+B-C )
Financial 
requirements o f  
SOEs/GNP 
%
1 9 7 3 5.1 14 .2 6.1 1 3 .2 4 . 6
1 9 7 4 l A 2 2 .3 7 .2 2 2 . 5 5 .2
1 9 7 5 8 .5 3 0 . 6 10 .3 2 8 . 8 5 .7
1 9 7 6 13 .6 4 7 . 8 16 .2 4 5 . 2 7.1
1 9 7 7 53 .1 5 8 .3 2 7 . 8 8 3 . 0 6 .7
1 9 7 8 37 .1 8 6 .3 3 9 .5 8 3 . 9 6 .7
1 9 7 9 87 .1 186.1 8 3 . 4 1 8 9 .8 8 .5
1 9 8 0 1 7 1 .6 2 6 4 .1 1 5 2 .9 2 8 2 . 8 6 .4
1981 1 1 2 .8 4 3 4 . 7 2 2 9 . 5 3 1 8 . 0 4 .8
1 9 8 2 1 9 7 .2 4 6 4 . 7 1 9 1 .4 4 7 0 . 5 5 .0
198 3 3 4 4 . 2 5 9 4 . 7 2 7 8 .1 6 6 0 . 8 6 .0
1 9 8 4 9 0 2 . 2 7 5 3 .3 2 3 8 . 8 1 4 1 6 .7 7 .7
1 9 8 5 6 3 5 . 0 9 6 8 . 6 1 7 1 .0 1 4 3 2 .6 5 .0
1 9 8 6 1 0 7 3 .0 1 0 0 8 .0 1 4 0 .0 1 9 4 1 .0 5 .0
m i 2 5 9 8 . 0 1 8 2 1 .0 4 4 6 . 0 3 9 7 3 . 0 6 .8
1 9 8 8 3 4 4 0 . 0 3 0 6 4 .1 1 0 0 7 .5 5 4 9 6 . 6 5 .5
1 9 8 9 9 4 0 4 . 0 3 4 1 5 . 8 1 1 0 8 .2 8 7 9 9 . 6 5 .0
One of the reasons for these huge amount of deficits for SOEs lie in the 
soft budget constraints faced by the public enterprises. In Turkey, financial 
extravagance is riskless for SOE management, because treasury-guaranteed loans 
will simply be rolled over (or can be converted into public equity) and until 
recently enterprises could not legally be liquidated or sold. As long as other 
sectors of the economy can be taxed (agriculture, mineral exports, worker 
remittances) and money can be borrowed from abroad, the growing SOE and 
public deficits can be financed.
Source: Waterbary, 1993.
In various ways SOEs are indebted to one another. They accumulate 
substantial arrears in payments for goods and services from other SOEs. The 
railroads are often victimized by those firms for which they haul goods or move 
passengers. There can be a kind of imploding chain of missed payments. The 
railroads may be denied financing for expansion. They delay payment to 
engineering firms or to iron and steel complexes for goods contracted and 
delivered. The latter may in turn postpone payment to the electricity authority for 
power used. Therefore, the more inefficient a public enterprise is, the higher its 
level of debt is.
The decision to set up a public sector is, therefore, congruent with the decision not to 
maximize profits. To create a public sector and then ask it to do what the private sector would have 
done is like going to the cinema to try to sleep rather than see the movie (Amartya Sen, 1975, as 
cited in Waterbury, 1993).
If credit and product markets are competitive, and if firms are allowed to 
fail, then public enterprises might be expected to perform as well as private. 
Sometimes they do. But the conditions mentioned above seldom apply: Credit is 
subsidized, markets protected, and SOEs prohibited from exit. Because policy 
makers have structured the competition in this manner, they could also structure it 
in radically different ways, but they do not.
Whether or not the regulatory regimes are the same, empirical studies tend 
to show systematic differences in performance between public and private 
enterprise. The situation is also valid for Turkey. Table 4 shows for Turkey what 
the impact of an administered increase in SOE prices can do to relative 
performance indicators. A major increase went through in 1983 with smaller ones 
in subsequent years. Although the private sector outperformed the public over the 
seven-year period, by 1985 the SOE profits-sales ratio had surged past the private. 
In all other areas the private sector maintained a clearly superior position.
TABLE 4 Productivity and rate ofprofit in 500 largest firms in Turkey^
Profit
Sales
(%)
Profit
Equity
(%)
Profit
Total assets
Value-added
Worker
(‘000 TL)
Value added 
Total assets
(%)
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Public (79) 4.80 16.16 16.16 2179.T
Private (421) 10.47 50.69 50.69 3054.6*
Public (64) 3.81 22.04 22.04 3477.8*
Private (431) 8.22 42.87 42.87 4831.8*
Public (64) 5.49 25.28 25.28 1581.7 23.04
Private (431) 6.47 37.55 37.55 2102.2 39.08
Public (74) 4.44 25.62 25.62 1156.6 14.47
Private (426) 6.88 48.98 48.98 2467.7 35.43
Public (84) 6.45 26.23 26.23 2495.7 20.11
Private (416) 6,99 37.83 37.83 3943.2 33.24
Public (94) 10.77 34.57 34.57 3853.0 17.40
Private (406) 6.05 41.06 41.06 5699.9 33.71
Public (91) 7.80 25.58 25.58 7831.3 27.06
Private (409) 6.09 39.93 39.93 9245.9 35.59
Large deficits in SOEs occur mostly because of the facts that they are 
politicized and have soft budgets. Electoral pressures cause overemployment and 
excessively high wages. These favors to the workers return to the new government 
as huge deficits. However, as the public enterprises have soft budgets, they do not 
pay their debt. They can postpone it or can get subsidies. Soft budgets enable 
them to compete without improving efficiency.
 ^ Source; Waterbury, 1993.
By contrast, the private enterprises are more market oriented. Their budget 
constraints are harder, are less subject to political pressures, and must pay their 
bills or debts in time. Therefore, they have to compete with improving the 
efficiency. There is evidence that after liberalization, efficiency of the private 
firms plays an important role in access to bank credit (Atiyas and Yulek, 1997). 
They found that the more the efficient the firm is, the more it has access to bank 
credit.
The correlation between debt and efficiency in private firms is found to be 
positive in previous research(Atiyas and Yulek, 1997). However, the greater 
ability of public firms to finance their losses by borrowing from the resources of 
public (as a result of the soft budget) may result in a negative relation between 
efficiency and debt levels of the public firms in Turkey.
There are two points to be concerned about the correlation between 
efficiency and debt levels for public firms due to the fact that the causality can be 
in two different directions. Firstly, inefficiency can cause easier access to bank 
credit for public firms. It means that the public firms which are inefficient can 
finance their debts more easily than the private firms, due to the soft budgets. 
Secondly, soft budgets, which enable the public firms to accumulate huge deficits, 
can cause the inefficiency of these firms. This direction of causality implies that 
the soft budgets faced by public firms, especially in their relation with the public 
banks, can cause these firms to work inefficiently. Both of these two points may 
create less positive correlation between debt level and efficiency, or even negative 
correlation, when we compare the public firms with the private ones. This thesis is 
really fundamentally concentrating in the first one. The relationship between 
efficiency and debt level is investigated by estimating capital structure equation 
both for public and private firms. A comparison of the two kinds of firms in the 
distribution of credit is done in the end.
Sales from production/number o f workers.
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3.DATA AND METHOD
3.1.Data
The empirical research of this thesis is based on information collected by 
the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) of Turkey. The data set used contain 
production , cost, investment and a limited set of financial variables for firms that 
employ more than 10 workers in the manufacturing industry in Turkey. The data is 
for the period 1985-1993. The data used is a subset of the SIS data set, in the sense 
that it includes firms that had reported positive values for fixed capital in the 
1985 survey. This data set was also used by Atiyas and Ytilek (1997). They also 
investigated efficiency and debt relationship. I followed their approach in 
eliminating some of the sectors and used the data set formed by them after 
eliminations . How they modified the data set can be summarized as follows. 
Firstly, the sectors that contained less than 150 firms were discarded. Then 
efficiencies were estimated from the production functions. According to the 
results of these estimations, two of the remaining sectors which had too noisy 
efficiency indices were also discarded. There were eight sectors remained after 
eliminations. The Standard Industrial Classification Codes (SIC) and description 
of the sectors left after eliminations are as follows: 311-food products, 321- 
textiles, 322-wearing apparel, 352-other chemicals, 381-metal products, 382-non­
electrical machinery, 383-electrical machinery, 384-transport equipment. The 
number of firms in the data set per year are presented in Table 1-A. These are the 
original data set observation numbers before eliminations. How this data set was 
modified will be discussed below.
The data set includes data on work hours, number of employees, total wage 
payments, expenditure values such as material, fuel, rent, interest, advertisement, 
communication, and etc., sales, number and power of electrical and non-electrical 
machinery, depreciation, internal resources, short-term and long- term bank
See Atiyas and YOlek (1997) for details.
i 1
credits, current assets, equity ratios, profits, value added, sum of all long-term 
financial and physical assets.
In addition, the following data was gathered. First of all, wholesale price 
indexes (WPI) for each sector were needed. They were collected from the surveys 
of SIS. Annual WPI, WPI at January prices, and WPI at December prices for each 
sector for the period 1985-1993 were gathered. These are shown in Table 2-A. 
These WPI were used to find the real values of value added and sales.
Secondly, the deflators of capital goods were needed. The deflators of 
machinery, buildings, and fixed capital in average constant 1987 prices and 
deflator of fixed capital in December in constant 1987 prices were calculated (See 
Appendix B for details). These deflators are presented in Table 1-B. They were 
used to calculate the real values of capital goods in average constant 1987 prices. 
All capital goods except the value of fixed capital were reported in annual 
average prices. The fixed capital values were reported in December values. So, 
they were deflated with the calculated December deflator of the corresponding 
year in constant 1987 prices.
In the production function estimated in the next section, value added is 
used as the dependent variable. It is the difference between the total output and 
intermediate goods.
The work hours of each firm was scaled by 10000 and these values were 
used as indicators of labor input.
The capital input had problems, because physical capital was not reported 
by the firms. Instead, the financial data included the sum of long term financial 
and physical assets as well as equity participations in other companies, severance 
payments, and guarantees. Since that composite variable was not a good measure 
of the physical capital stock, the physical capital stock series were formed with the
well-known capital law of motion equation which is shown below:
K, =( \ -5 ) K ,_ , ^ I ,
where K, = capital stock in period t 
/, = investment in period t 
S -  depreciation of capital goods
Since the depreciation reported by firms may not represent the economic 
depreciation of physical assets, 10% was used as the rate of depreciation.
The 85-year capital stock value was taken and the rest of the data was 
formed by capital law of motion equation. In these calculations, the firms which 
had any missing data in their investment values and which did not have sequential 
investment data were eliminated. After eliminating these firms, I formed the 
physical capital stock series for the rest of the firms in each sector.
This capital data still had distortions in it. Because I started to form the 
new series with the capital value reported by the firms. The capital stock values 
became to be closer to the true value when the new estimated values were used, 
i.e. when the years passed. So, in my estimations I used the interval 1988-1993. In 
that way, I tried to get rid of most of the distortions in the data. However, that data 
still was not exactly a good substitute for the true capital value. How I dealt with 
this problem will be explained in the following section.
In all of my estimations^ I excluded the firms with less than 3 observations 
in the given period.
Firms had to be classified as public and private. Equity shares of the firms 
reported in the data set were used for this purpose. Firstly, the observations in 
which equity shares were misreported were excluded. There were observations of
’ For estimations, LIMDEP is used. It is an econometric software used for estimating the sorts of 
regression models most frequently analyzed with cross section data. Its name comes from Limited 
Dependent Variable Models. 1 used version 6.0 of it.
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total equity shares equal to 0% or more than 100%. So, they were excluded before 
classifying the firms. A firm was classified as “public” if its equity share held by 
public sector was greater than or equal to 40%, and as “private” otherwise.
3.2.Econometric Method
Firm specific technical efficiencies were estimated using panel data 
techniques. I began with a Cobb-Douglas representation of technology relating for 
input and value added in a given industry:
yu -  ^  + + A '^2ii+ i=  1,...,N 
t=  1,...,T
( 1 )
where y is the real value added, x/, ...,x* represent the factors of production, all 
expressed in logarithms; i is the index representing each firm, t is a time index; a  
and Pi, ...,Pk are unknown parameters to be estimated, v,, represents random errors. 
Ui (iii > 0) represents firm specific technical inefficiency. It is assumed to be 
constant for each firm.
The random error Vn is assumed to be iid across firms and time with 
identical zero mean and constant variance. It is also assumed to be uncorrelated 
with factor inputs. The other error component, Ui, is assumed to be independently 
and identically distributed across firms.
Equation (1) can be modified to fit into the standard variable-intercept 
model for panel data estimations as:
y,, =a,  +^iXii( +^2’‘ 2it+.....+Pk^kit (2)
whereaj=a -Uj
14
I will use labor input and capital input as factors of production in the 
estimations. I have no problem with labor input. The true capital is unobservable, 
and its proxy, the capital stock series I had formed, is not the exact substitute for 
it. Hence part of disturbance term will reflect capital stock mismeasurement, and 
the coefficient on capital itself will be biased. So, these measurement error biases 
have to be corrected. For this aim, instrumental variable estimation'*’ is used. 
Firstly, I assumed that the ‘true’ capital stock, K*, satisfies the following two 
equations:
^  ■'■^ 3X3 + ^ 7 + ( 3 )
K = K ' + 4 ^  (4)
where K = logarithm of the capital stock formed 
K* = logarithm of the true capital stock
In this system, Zy, Z?, and Z 3  are the three instruments used for the true 
capital stock, ;^and rj are scalar and they are to be estimated by regressions, and 
2^ are random disturbances independent of each other with constant means and 
variances.
Three instrumental variables are used for the true capital stock. The 
description of them are as follows:
Z, = electricity consumption in kwh
Zj = ^  (Total number of machines - Total number generators)
Z3 = ^  (Total power of machines- Total power generators)
Combining equations (3) and (4), the system can be expressed by the 
observable variables as below:
= y,Z| +^2^2 + ^ 3 ^ 3 + +^2 (5)
See Judge, Griffiths, Llltkepohl and Lee, 1988 for details.
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Now the system contain variables which are observed, so I can make 
estimations of capital stock.
The system of equations needed to estimate firm specific efficiencies are 
as follows:
and
y,i -  +/^2^ii + (6)
where = a  -
In order to estimate the efficiencies two stage least square regression 
model (2SLS) is used. In the first step, I estimated the capital stock values from 
equation(5) by ordinary least squares approach (OLS). Then I used the fitted 
values of capital stock estimated from this regression as proxy'' for capital input 
in equation(6).
Equation(6) is a one factor fixed effects model if a, is treated as fixed and 
a random effects model if a, is treated as random. The model is shown below:
y,i =OC + /?, + Pj P, + £¡1 + Ui
where
E[wj = 0, Var[ivJ-£T^, Cov[fj,,uJ = 0
jUi = a  + w, where //, is individual specific disturbance
Equation(6) is estimated with both one factor fixed and random effects 
models and performed Hausman tests to decide which model to use in the rest of 
the estimations. Hausman test favored the fixed effects model at 0% significance 
level in each of the 8 sectors. As a result, the efficiencies estimated by fixed 
effects model is used in the rest of the thesis.
" See Tybout and Corbo, 1991 for details.
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The efficiencies estimated by equation(6) are the individual effects 
excluding the effects of time. 1 then estimated equation(6) by including time 
effects. The regression model is again fixed effects model but now with 6 time 
dummies which can be written as follows:
y,, = (7)
where a , = ¿r -w,
This is a two factor fixed effects model if a, represent a constant for group 
effects and co, represent a constant lor time effects. It is a two factor random 
effects model if a, represent a random variable for group effects and a)i represent a 
random variable for time effects. The variable for time effects is constant across 
firms. It captures the change in the efficiencies of through years.
A Hausman test was made to decide whether the two factor fixed model or 
two factor random effects model is better. Hausman test resulted that at 0% 
significance level two factor fixed effects model is better. So, the results of the 
two factor fixed effects model was used in the rest of the estimations.
The firm specific efficiencies estimated by one factor and two factor fixed 
effects models are different from each other. The firm specific efficiencies 
obtained from one factor model are contaminated by shocks that affect all firms in 
each year. The firm specific efficiencies estimated from two factor model controls 
for the possible time effects common to all firms and it purely reflects the firm 
specific efficiencies. In order to decide which of the models is better, I performed 
F-tests for each sector. The null hypothesis that the time dummies were all equal 
to zero was tested. The time effects were significant in all of the sectors. So, I 
concluded that I will have better estimations for the rest of my models if I use the 
firm specific efficiencies estimated from the two factor fixed effects model.
The next step is to examine the determinants of indebtedness, and the role 
of inefficiency in particular, at the firm level. The dependent variable is the ratio
17
of bank credit to total resources. There were zeros reported for the bank credit 
variable. Because there was some doubt about which of these were really zero and 
which were unreported, I used different samples and tried to get rid of 
observations which were likely to represent misreporting.
Tobit model is used for the models which has censored dependent 
variable. Censored means that the dependent variable cannot be observed in some 
range. If it is out of that range, its true value can be observed. If it is in this range, 
same limit value is observed for all observations, just like observing zero for the 
bank credit variable in our model.
Besides the Tobit model, other techniques were also used for estimating 
the leverage equation. The details will be discussed in the next section.
See Judge, Griffiths, Llltkepohl and Lee, 198.'5 for details.
4.INDEBTEDNESS AND EFFICIENCY
In this section, a standard capital structure equation will be estimated. The 
dependent variable for this equation is the ratio of total bank credits to total 
resources'^ (BCTR). Firm specific efficiencies are one of the regressors. The 
section will investigate if the efficiency plays a role in firms’ access to bank credit, 
and try to find if there are differences in public and private firms in these 
estimations.
In order to control for the possible misreporting of the bank credit variable 
by the firms, I formed a restricted sample from which I excluded observations 
with zero bank credit but positive interest payments. If there were some 
misreporting in the original sample, then this restricted sample would be less 
distorted.
The median values of the efficiencies obtained from one factor model 
(EFFI), the efficiencies obtained from two factor model (EFFT), BCTR, the real 
value of sales indicating the size of the firms (SIZE), and profitability of the firms 
(PROFTB) for each sample are given in Table 1-C. The table also presents the 
number of private and public firms and the number of observations in each 
sample.
In both the full and the restricted samples, the profitability of private firms 
are higher than the profitability of the public firms. The median value of 
profitability (MEDPROFTB ) is negative for public firms and positive for private 
firms. Taking the restricted sample reduces each of MEDPROFTB.
SIZE indicates that public firms are larger than private firms in both 
samples. When we take the restricted sample, SIZE becomes smaller in the public 
sector and becomes larger in the private sector. It means that the observations we
Total resources “ internal resources  ^total bank credit + other debts
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excluded as misreported bank credit values are large firms for the public sector 
and smaller firms for the private sector.
Median value of the ratio of bank debt to total resources (MEDBCTR) for 
public firms is larger than private firms in both samples. But when we take the 
restricted sample the difference between them becomes smaller.
The median value of the efficiencies estimated from one factor fixed 
effects model (MEDEFFI) for public firms are greater than those of the private 
firms for both of the samples. Again, the difference becomes smaller when 
restricted sample is used.
The median value of the efficiencies estimated from two factor fixed 
effects model (MEDEFFT) for public firms are smaller than those of the private 
firms for both of the samples. The difference becomes larger when the restricted 
sample is used.
The restricted sample is formed by excluding 16 public firms out of 77 
and 125 private firms out of 779. It means that approximately 10% of the firms 
misreported bank credit variable. The restricted sample can be used to control for 
the misreport of the firms. On the other hand, the efficiencies estimated by the two 
factor fixed effects model (EFFT) purely estimates the firm specific efficiencies. 
As a conclusion, I will use the restricted sample results and EFFT for my 
comparisons of public and private firms.
There may be several conclusions from the results of Table 1-C. Firstly, 
although the public firms are larger than private firms, they are less efficient and 
less profitable than private firms. Secondly, the data suggest that the public firms 
can get more credits from the banks.
In order to estimate capital structure equation 1 used several regressors that 
may affect access to bank credit.
20
F tests performed suggest that EFFT is the variable that should be used to 
capture firm level efficiency. Below, I used both EFFl and EFFT for the purposes 
of comparison.
LARGE is used as an indicator of the size of the firm, and is equal to the 
logarithm of real sales. It is known from literature that larger firms have greater 
access to bank credit (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Smaller firms are more likely 
to be liquidity constrained in their investment decisions. They are more inclined to 
take risky projects with the credit they get from the banks. The bank managers 
know this, so they ration the credit given to the smaller firms more than the large 
firms. As a result, I will expect positive relationship between LARGE and BCTR.
CFAS is the ratio of cash flow to total assets. It is an indicator of the 
internal funds of the firm. If the internal funds of the firm is higher, then the firm 
will need external funds less and use its internal funds for investment according to 
the well known “pecking order” theory of financing'"' ,i.e., capital structure is 
driven by firms’ desire to finance new investments, first internally, then with low- 
risk debt, and finally with equity only as a last resort. According to another point 
of view, if cash flow of the firm is higher, then it means that tlie firm has higher 
liquidation value. It is then concluded'^ that debt level increases with the 
liquidation value of the firm. As a result, 1 will expect negative relationship 
between CFAS and BCTR.
ADVSA is the ratio of advertisement expenditures to total sales. 
Advertisement expenditures represent the intangible part of the assets. So, if the 
advertisement expenditures increase, the liquidation value of the firm decreases. 
So, 1 expect that ADVSA will be negatively related to BCTR.
MAINCIT is a dummy variable indicating the location of the firm which 
has value one for large cities (Izmir, Ankara, Istanbul, Adana, Kocaeli, and Bursa). 
1 will try to find whether the firms in large cities have greater access to bank credit
See Harris and Raviv 1991. 
See Harris and Raviv, 1990.
or not. It may be possible that firms in large cities have greater access to bank 
credit.
Estimations will be carried out for both the full sample and the restricted 
sample, to see if possible misreporting affects any of the results.
4.1.Regressions Using Cross Section Data
In these estimations, the average value of BCTR was regressed on average 
values of efficiencies, LARGE, CFAS, ADVSA, and MAINCIT.
Firstly, the capital structure equation was estimated by cross section Tobit 
regressions and used EFFI as firm specific efficiency (See Table 4-C Panel A for 
estimation results). For both of the samples, the coefficient of the public sector 
efficiency is negative and insignificant. This means that whether we take the 
restricted sample or the full sample, the efficiency of the public firms is not 
important while they are taking credits from the banks. The coefficient of the 
efficiency of the private firms is positive and highly significant for both of the 
samples. The coefficient and the degree of significance increases if we use the 
restricted sample. This means that the efficiency of the private firms is 
significantly positively correlated with BCTR. The more efficient firms have more 
access to bank credit which is consistent with the literature. LARGE is both highly 
significant and positively correlated with BCTR for both of the samples and for 
both the public and private firms. It means that the larger the fimi is, the greater is 
its access to bank credit independent of its being private or public. The coefficient 
of LARGE for public firms is greater than the coefficient for private firms. The 
importance of being large for public firms is more than the importance of being 
large for private firms. CFAS has negative sign but is insignificant for public 
firms for both of the samples. It is highly significant and has negative sign for 
private firms for both of the samples. These mean that cash flow of public firms 
does not have any effect on the access to credit of the public Finns. However, cash
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flow, i.e., the internal funds is an important determinant of debt among private 
firms. Since the cash flow variable captures the costs of external financing 
associated with agency problems between borrowers and lenders, this result may 
also suggest that those specific types of agency problems do not characterize the 
relation between public banks and public firms. It is surprising that ADVSA has 
positive, very large and highly significant coefficient for public firms and has 
insignificant coefficient for private firms.. MAINCIT is insignificant for both of 
the types of the firms indicating that the location of the firm play no role in firm’s 
access to bank credit.
Secondly, the capital structure equation was estimated by cross section 
Tobit model using EFFT as firm specific efficiency (See Table 4-C Panel B for 
estimation results). None of the signs of the coefficients of the variables changed 
when EFFT was used instead of EFFI. The things that had changed are the 
significance levels and the coefficients. In the first estimation, EFFI is 
insignificant for public firms and significant for private firms. But in this 
regression EFFT is negative and significant for public firms, but insignificant for 
private firms. It means that the more inefficient a public firm is, the more it has 
bank credit. The efficiency of the private firms has no effect on their access to 
bank credit. The significance of LARGE, CFAS, ADVSA, and MAINCIT did not 
change when EFFT was used as firm specific efficiency.
4.2.Regressions Using Pooled Data
In these estimations, BCTR was regressed on efficiencies, LARGE, CFAS, 
ADVSA, and MAINCIT. I used the pooled data in these estimations. First kind of 
the regression used was the Tobit regression. The second is panel data regression 
models. I tried to find firm specific efficiencies by fixed effects regression. The 
fixed effects of the capital structure equation are highly correlated with the
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efficiencies estimated from the production function. So, I could not use the fixed 
effects model. Instead of this model, I used random effects model.
Firstly, the capital structure equation was estimated by pooled Tobit 
regressions and EFFI was used as firm specific efficiency (See Table 5-C Panel A 
for estimation results). The signs of coefficients and significance of EFFI, 
LARGE, ADVSA, and MAINCIT are the same as the results of the cross section 
Tobit estimations done with EFFI. This time CFAS is highly significant and has 
negative coefficient for both public and private firms and for both of the samples. 
It means that the more internal funds the firm is, the less it uses bank credit.
Secondly, the capital structure equation was estimated by pooled Tobit 
regressions and EFFT was used as firm specific efficiency (See Table 5-C Panel B 
for estimation results). The signs of coefficients and significance of EFFI, 
LARGE, and ADVSA are the same as the results of the cross section Tobit 
estimations done with EFFT. CFAS is highly significant and has negative sign for 
public and private firms in the full sample and for the private firms in the 
restricted .sample, but it is insignificant for public firms in the restricted sample. 
MAINCIT is only significant for public sector in the restricted sample with 
negative sign. It means that if the firm is located in a large city, it has less access 
to bank credit which conflicts to what I expected.
Thirdly, the capital structure equation was estimated by pooled OLS 
random effects regressions and EFFI was used as firm specific efficiency (See 
Table 5-C Panel C for estimation results). ADVSA and MAINCIT are both 
insignificant for all firms in all samples. EFFI is significant for all private firms 
whereas it is insignificant for all public firms. The significance and coefficient of 
EFFI for private firms increase if we use the restricted sample. LARGE is 
significant and has positive coefficient for all firms. CFAS is only significant for 
the private firms in the restricted sample with a negative sign.
Finally, the capital structure equation by pooled OLS random effects 
regressions and EFFT was used as firm specific efficiency (See Table 5-C Panel D
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for estimation results). ADVSA and MAINCIT are again insignificant for all firms 
in all samples. EFFT is significant only for public firms in the full sample and it 
has negative sign. LARGE is significant and has positive sign for all firms. CFAS 
is only significant for the private firms in the restricted sample and it has negative 
sign.
As I explained in the previous section, I did tests for using EFFI or EFFT. 
According to these results, I had to use EFFT, the efficiency estimated from the 
one factor fixed effects model. Flence I find estimation results that use EFFT more 
reliable. It was also argued above that the restricted sample is more likely to avoid 
observations with misreporting. As result, I will use the estimation results with 
EFFT and restricted sample for my conclusions.
In all regressions LARGE, the variable indicating the size of the firm, is 
highly significant with positive coefficient for all firms. So, it can be concluded 
that the size of the firm affects the access to credit of the firm positively whether 
the firm is public or private. It means that the larger the firm is, the more it is able 
to get credit from the banks.
CFAS, the variable indicating the internal resources of the firm, is always 
highly significant and has coefficient negative for private firms, i.e., the more 
internal funds a private firm has, the less it needs to obtain external funds from the 
banks. CFAS is insignificant with the correct sign for public firms. I can conclude 
that the internal funds of the public firms is not important while taking bank 
credits. Again, this probably suggests that these specific types of agency problems 
do not have a strong presence in the public sector.
ADVSA, the variable indicating the intangible part of the assets, is always 
insignificant with the correct sign for the private firms. I expected it to be 
significant with a negative coefficient. But, according to my results, the 
advertisement expenditures of the private firms has no effect on private firms’ 
access to credit. Except the OLS random effects regression, the ADVSA is 
.surprisingly significant with a positive and huge coefficient for public firms. I
2.S
think there is some misreport of the advertisement expenditures by the firms. So, I 
do not pay much attention to the results of this variable.
MAINCIT, the variable indicating the location of the firm, is only 
significant at 5% level in pooled Tobit regression for the public firms. In all other 
regressions, this variable is insignificant. It means that the location of the firm is 
not an important factor while taking credit from the banks. The firms in all cities, 
everything else constant, are equally likely to obtain bank credits.
The variable that concerns this thesis most is the efficiency variable. This 
variable is always significant and has negative coefficient for public firms except 
for the OLS random effects model. It can be concluded that the more inefficient 
public firms have more access to bank credit. Surprisingly, efficiency plays no role 
in access to credit for private firms according to my estimation results. It is 
insignificant, but has positive sign as expected.
Results show that the relation between debt and efficiency among private 
firms is different from that among public firms. For future research, several 
improvements can be made both in the specification and estimation of the model. 
Two may be especially important: First, it may be important to control for sectoral 
differences by including sector dummies. Second, corrections for possible 
heteroskedasticity in the variance of error terms may be introduced.
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5.CONCLUSION
The results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, internal funds is 
negatively correlated with access to bank credit for the private firms whereas it has 
no effect on credit for public firms.
Secondly, the size of the firm is an important factor while taking credit for 
both the public and the private firms. Indebtedness of the larger firms is higher.
Finally, 1 found that efficiency and credit is negatively related for public 
firms. The efficiency of private firms seems to have no impact on credit according 
to my results. The coefficient of the efficiency is positive for the private firms, but 
it is insignificant. I ’his suggests that public firms which are more inefficient can 
increase their debt levels more as they are supported by the government. It is also 
possible that soft budget constraints cause lower efficiency in public sector firms, 
though this hypothesis has not been directly tested in this study. However, the 
results seem to be consistent with this hypothesis as well. According to these 
findings, I can conclude that the external finance in public and private firms are 
not similar. In order to make the public firms work efficiently, they must have 
either hard budgets or must be privatized.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX-A 
Table 1 -A
Number of observations per year and industry in tlie original data set. (The 3 digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes and the names of the sectors are as follows: 311-Food 
products, 321-Textiles, 322-Wearing apparel, 352-Other chemicals, 381-Metal products, 382-Non­
electrical machinery, 383-Flectrical machinery, 384-Transport equipment)
311 321 322 352 381 382 383 384
1985 4 7 6 611 2 4 4 153 3 2 6 2 8 6 2 0 2 189
1986 421 5 3 4 2 1 2 132 295 2 5 2 190 178
1987 388 505 2 0 6 133 2 7 9 2 5 7 172 166
1988 3 7 4 473 213 127 245 2 2 9 171 154
1989 365 4 4 8 2 0 2 121 2 2 8 213 107 143
1990 331 4 3 0 190 123 223 203 146 136
1991 301 4 0 3 168 113 203 177 133 136
1992 2 8 0 388 146 107 182 167 122 128
1993 3 2 7 415 162 114 201 185 132 136
Table 2-A
‘^ Wholesale price indexes (WPI) in the sectors in years 1985-1993. 
WPl : Average WPI. It is calculated by taking the average of 
12 months’ WPls.
WPIBEG : WPI in January of the given year.
WPIEND : WPI in December of the given year.
Panel A: Sector 311
YEAR SECTOR WPI WPIBEG WPIEND
85 311 58 53 73
86 311 76 73 92
87 311 100 92 136
88 311 184 136 2 2 9
89 311 3 1 0 2 2 9 381
9 0 311 4 7 0 381 5 6 7
91 3 i T 763 5 6 7 9 8 7
92 311 1323 9 8 7 1682
93 311 2 2 1 4 1682 2 9 5 2
Source: St:Ve Institute of Statistics (SIS).
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Panel B : Sector 321
YEAR SECTOR WPI WP1I3EG WPIEND
85 321 58 44 60
86 321 76 60 75
87 321 100 75 112
88 321 166 112 189
89 321 249 189 305
90 321 382 305 447
91 321 572 447 711
92 321 980 711 1162
93 321 1552 1162 2153
Panel C: Sector 322
YEAR SECTOR WPI WPIBEG WPIEND
85 322 58 43 59
86 322 76 59 73
87 322 100 73 109
88 322 159 109 183
89 322 259 183 290
90 322 437 290 604
91 322 969 604 1228
92 322 1589 1228 1796
93 322 2103 1796 2608
Panel D: Sector 352
YEAR SECTOR WPI WPIBEG WPIEND
85 352 58 50 69
86 352 76 69 85
87 352 100 85 127
88 352 176 127 214
89 352 302 214 377
90 352 438 377 505
91 352 685 505 792
92 352 993 792 1292
93 352 1543 1292 1755
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Panel E; Sector 381
YEAR SECTOR WPl WPIBEG WPIEND
85 381 58 48 66
86 381 76 66 83
87 381 100 83 123
88 381 165 123 207
89 381 247 207 292
90 381 373 292 418
91 381 554 418 667
92 381 884 667 1143
93 381 1517 1143 1909
Panel F: Sector 382
YEAR SECTOR WPl WPIBEG WPIEND
85 382 58 63 87
86 382 76 87 108
87 382 100 108 161
88 382 209 161 270
89 382 308 270 372
90 382 503 372 599
91 382 821 599 951
92 382 1235 951 1714
93 382 2011 1714 2380
Panel G: Sector 383
YEAR SECTOR WPl WPIBEG WPIEND
85 383 58 47 65
86 383 76 65 82
87 383 100 82 122
88 383 179 122 204
89 383 266 204 305
90 383 390 305 435
91 383 553 435 630
92 383 970 630 1325
93 383 1732 1325 1949
Panel H: Sector 384
YEAR SECTOR WPI WPIBEG WPIEND
85 384 58 50 69
86 384 76 69 86
87 384 100 86 127
88 384 185 127 214
89 384 276 214 315
90 384 398 315 442
91 384 566 442 641
92 384 980 641 1347
93 384 1725 1347 1955
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APPENDIX B
CALCULATION OF THE DEFLATORS 
FOR CAPITAL GOODS
Deflators for capital goods are obtained from the national accounts, by 
dividing nominal investment expenditures to expenditures expressed in constant 
terms:
Nominal gross (fixed capital formation - residential buildings) 
Real gross (fixed capital formation - residential buildings)
X 100 Capital deilator
in average 1987 prices 
( KDl 'FAV)
Nominal non - residential buildings formation 
Real non - residential buildings formation
X 100 = Land and construction deflator
in average 1987 prices 
(BUILDDEF)
Nominal other gross capital formation 
Real other capital formation
X 100 = Fixed equipment, machienery and
equipment and transportation deflator 
in average 1987 prices 
(MACDLF)
In order to calculate these values for all years in the sample period two 
sources are used, since the complete GNP data could not be found in any one 
source.
The flrst source'^ contains GNP data for years after 1987. It reports the real 
GNP in constant average 1987 prices. The second source'* was used for the rest of 
the data. This source reports real GNP in constant 1968 prices, so they are 
converted to constant average 1987 prices.
All these deflators are in constant 87 average prices, because all the 
variables except the value of fixed capital are in aimual average prices. The capital 
stock data had to be converted to annual average prices with deflators in order to 
be used in the regressions with the other variables.
17 „Ekonomik ve Sosyal Göstergeler”, 1997, DPT (March).
3.1
The capital stock values are reported at the end of each year. So, they are 
in December prices. I know the current year’s and the next year’s capital deflators 
in annual average prices based on year 1987. The problem is to find the December 
capital deflator of current year from these two data. I assumed that the capital 
deflator growth is logarithmic. It means that I have assumed that capital deflator 
growth is constant. So, the December deflator is calculated by taking the 
geometric mean of the two annual deflators. The steps followed are as below : 
KDEFAV,(l + g)  ^ =KDEFAV,^I
KDEFAV, x(KDEFAV,(l + g)^) = KDEFAV, xKDEFAV,,,
(KDEFAV,(I + g))  ^ = KDEFAV, x KDEFAV,l + l
ln(K DEFAV,(l + g)) =
ln(K D E FA V ,)+ ln(KDEFAV,^i)
KDEFAV, (I+  g) = (KDEFAV, x KDEFAV, ^, ) =  KDEFDEC
December 
capital dellalor
where g : the 6-month growth rate for capital deflator
which is assumed to be constant
KDEFAV : capital deflator for each year in constant 1987 prices 
KDEFDEC: capital deflator for December of each year 
in constant 1987 prices
IK .. National Accounts”, 190]. Department of Fconomics and Statistics, OECD, Paris.
TABLE 1-B
I he machinery , building deflators and yearly average and December capital dellators'*  ^are given 
at 1987 constant prices for years 1985-1993.
YEAR MACDEF BEILDDEF KDEFAV KDEFDEC
85 56 49 46 58
86 76 64 72 85
87 100 100 100 132
88 169 193 175 213
89 247 291 260 315
90 356 457 381 481
91 558 769 608 775
92 918 1225 988 1229
93 1405 2087 1530 2381
See the te.xt for source.
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APPENDIX-C 
TABLE 1-C
Description of the variables used in explaining the median levels of some variables in the sample
LABEL DESCRIPTION
M E D bm
MnDlirn
Mf-DBCfR
SlZli
Ml-DPROFfB
Median value of efficiencies which are estimated by OLS fixed effects regression 
with firm dummy variables
Median value of efficiencies which are estimated by OLS fixed effects regression
with firm and time dummy variables
Median value of the ratio o f total bank credit to total assets
Median value of the real sales
Median value of the profitabilities__________________________________________
TABLE 2-C
Median values of efficiencies, BCTR, real sales, profitability are given below (variable 
descriptions are in Table 1-C). Full sample is the sample without restrictions on BC'fR and 
interest expenditures. The restricted sample excludes the observations with zero bank credits but 
positive interest expenditures. Firms with less than 3 observations are excluded while forming each 
of the samples. Each sample contains observations for the time interval 1988-1993.
PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE
PUBLIC PRIVATE
MEDEFFI -0.98960 -1.1092
MEDEFFT -0.15908 -0.031636
MEDBCTR 0.15096 0.18212
SIZE 71052 29767
MEDPROFTB -0.022937 0.075875
Number of firms 77 779
Number of observations 328 3580
PANEL B: RESTRICTED SAMPLE
PUBLIC PRIVATE
MEDEI'FI -1.0628 -1.1178
MEDEFFT -0.23174 -0.020072
MEDBCTR 0.22933 0.23628
SIZE 67421 32659
MEDPROFTB -0.02687 0.071786
Number of firms 61 654
Number of observations 249 2806
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TABLE 3-C
Description of the variables used in estimations.
LABEL DESCRIPTION
BCTR
EFFI
EFFF
LARGE
CFAS
ADVSA
MAINCIT
Ratio of total bank credit to total resources
Efficiencies estimated by OLS fixed effects regression with firm dummy variables 
Efficiencies estimated by OLS fixed effects regression with firm and time dummy 
variables
Logarithm of real value o f sales
The ratio of cash flow to total assets
The ratio of advertisement expenditures to sales
The dummy variable indicating the location of the firm________________________
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TABLE 4-C
Cross section Tobit regressions of group means of BCTR on the group means of LARGE, CFAS, 
ADVSA, MAINCIT and efficiencies. Two regressions are made for each sample: one with EFFI 
and one with EFFT. Observations are for the time interval 1988-1993. (p-values in parentheses).
DEl’ENDEN'l' VARIABLE
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BC'l'R
PANEL A: CROSS-SECTIONAL TOBIT REGRESSIONS USING EFFI
FULL SA M P L E R ESTRICTED S A M P L E
PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE
INTERCEPT -0.694* -0.374* -0.933* -0.268*
(0.030) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000)
|·;I·FI -0.006 0.003* -0.007 0.005*
(0.407) (0.031) (0.345) (0.001)
LARGE 0.075* 0.056* 0.099* 0.05*
(0.008) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
CEAS -0.022 -0.033* -0.103 -0.123*
(0.335) (0.025) (0.137) (0.000)
ADVSA 26.675* -0.065 31.010* 0.221
(0.032) (0.718) (0.014) (0.591)
MAINCIT -0.063 0.016 -0.055 0.005
(0.324) (0.297) (0.413) (0.775)
r2 0.11“ 0.15“ 0.18“ 0.15“
Number of observations 77 779 61 654
* represents significance of the variable at 10% significance level. 
‘*R^  from ordinary least squares regression.
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PANEL B :  CROSS-SECTIONAL TOBIT REGRESSIONS USING EFFT
FULL SA M P L E R E STR IC TE D SA M P L E
PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE
INTERCEPT -1.261* -0.367* -1.456* -0.259*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
El^rr -0.128* 0.004 -0.114* 0.005
(0.002) (0.631) (0.015) (0.603)
LARGE 0.122* 0.054* 0.145* 0.049*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CPAS -0.016 -0.031* -0.038 -0.115*
(0.473) (0.039) (0.596) (0.000)
ADVSA 44.107* -0.050 46.480* 0.268
(0.001) (0.783) (0.001) (0.519)
MAINCIT -0.054 0.012 -0.060 0.001
(0.362) (0.410) (0.353) (0.946)
0.18“* 0.14*' 0.22** 0.13**
Number of observations 77 779 61 654
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Pooled Tobit regressions of BCTR on LARGE, CFAS, ADVSA, MAINCLI' and efficiencies.Two 
regressions each are made for each sample : one with EFFI and one with EFFT. Observations are 
in the time interval 1988-1993. (p-values in parentheses).
TABLE 5-C
DEPENDEN’f VARIABLE
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE
BCfR
PANEL A: POOLED 1 OBIT REGRESSIONS USING EFFI
FULL SA M P L E R E STR IC TE D S A M P L E
PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE
INTERCEPT -0.918* -0.578* -0.858* -0.359*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EFFI -0.008 0.004* -0.008 0.005*
(0.158) (0.002) (0.143) (0.000)
LARGE 0.084* 0.069* 0.095* 0.058*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CFAS -0.143* -0.035* -0.067* -0.139*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000)
ADVSA 15.596* 0.012 12.5* 0.109
(0.022) (0.897) (0.041) (0.361)
MAINCIT -0.066 0.013 -0.092* 0.001
(0.216) (0.285) (0.065) (0.990)
R2 0.04« 0.08« 0.08« 0.09«
Number of observations 345 3580 249 2806
dO
PANEL B: POOLED TOBIT REGRESSIONS USING EFFT
FULL SA M P L E R E STR IC TE D S A M P L E
PUBLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE
INTHRCEPT -1.242* -0.565* -1.078* ^ -0338* '
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BFI'T -0.120* 0.007 -0.086* 0.011
(0.001) (0.318) (0.008) (0.140)
LARGE o. m * 0.068* 0.114* 0.056*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CLAS -0.110* -0.035* -0.045 -0.136*
(0.003) (0.000) (0.187) (0.000)
ADVSA 21.647* 0.016 16.816* 0.116
(0.002) (0.868) (0.007) (0.333)
MAINCIT -0.070 0.009 -0.010* -0.005
(0.181) (0.455) (0.043) (0.684)
R2 0.07« 0.08« 0.09« 0.08“
Number of observations 345 3580 249 2806
PANEL C: OLS RANDOM EFFECTS REGRESSIONS USING EFFI
FULL SA M P L E R E STR IC TE D SA M P L E
PlJEiLIC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE
INTERCEPT -0.143 -0.204* -0.205 -0.138*
(0.360) (0.000) (0.260) (0.001)
EFFI -0.005 0.004* -0.007 0.005*
(0.389) (0.005) (0.280) (0.000)
l.ARGE 0.032* 0.040* 0.043* 0.038*
fO.024) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
CFAS -0.005 -0.007 -0.030 -0.052*
(0.249) (0.224) (0.226) (0.000)
ADVSA 1.613 0.040 1.776 0.078
(0.664) (0.362) (0.666) (0.364)
MAINCIT -0.044 0.011 -0.064 0.004
(0.365) (0.374) (0.249) (0.770)
r2 0.04 0.08^» 0.07t» 0.09^5
O.O4C 0.08^ 0.08^ O.O9C
Number of observations 345 3580 249 2806
*’R" for the random effects regression including the influence of the random effects. 
‘"R" for the random effects regression excluding the influence of the random effects.
PANEL D: OLS RANDOM EFFECTS REGRESSIONS USING EFFT
FULL SA M P L E R E STR IC TE D SA M P L E
PUBUC PRIVATE PUBLIC PRIVATE
INTERCEPT -0.226 -0.190* -0.262 -0.120*
(0.154) (0.000) (0.151) (0.008)
RFFl' -0.055* 0.009 -0.045 0.011
(0.050) (0.240) (0.158) (0.226)
LARGF 0.039* 0.038* 0.048* 0.036*
(0.006) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
CFAS -0.005 -0.007 -0.026 -0.050*
(0.261) (0.248) (0.304) (0.000)
ADVSA 3.017 0.041 2.953 0.078
(0.421) (0.367) (0.477) (0.361)
MAINCIT -0.043 0.007 -0.067 -0.001
(0.350) (0.581) (0.216) (0.971)
R“ 0.07^ 0.07*5 0.09*5 0.08*5
0.07^ 0.08^ 0.09C 0.08^
Number o f observations 345 3580 249 2806
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